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Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich
What is this new cult of Asianism, at whose shrine more and more incense is being
offered by vast numbers of thinking Asiatics, far and near? And what has this gospel
of Asianism, rightly understood and properly interpreted, to do with the merely political
cry of ‘Asia for the Asiatics’? For true it is, clear to all who have eyes to see and ears to
hear, that Asia is fast developing a new consciousness of her specific mission, her orig-
inal contribution to Euro-America.
———Nripendra Chandra Banerji1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Asianisms, that is, discourses and ideologies claiming that Asia can be defined
and understood as a homogenous space with shared and clearly defined charac-
teristics, have become the subject of increased scholarly attention over the last
two decades. The focal points of interest, however, are generally East Asian
varieties of regionalism.2 That “the cult of Asianism” has played an important
Acknowledgments: Parts of this article draw on a short essay published as: Harald Fischer-Tiné,
“‘The Cult of Asianism’: Asiendiskurse in Indien zwischen Nationalismus und Internationalismus
(ca. 1885–1955),” Comparativ 18, 6 (2008): 16–33.
1 From Asianism and other Essays (Calcutta: Arya Publishing House, 1930), 1. Banerji was Pro-
fessor of English at Bangabasi College, Calcutta, and a friend of Chittaranjan Das, who propagated
pan-Asianism in the Indian National Congress in the 1920s.
2 Among others: Sven Saaler and Victor J. Koschmann, eds., Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese
History: Colonialism, Regionalism, and Borders (London: Routledge, 2007); Cemil Aydin, The
Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian
Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Eri Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s
War 1931–1945 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Christopher W. A. Szpilman, “The
Dream of One Asia: Ôkawa Shûmei and Japanese Pan-Asianism,” in Harald Füss, ed., The Japa-
nese Empire in East Asia and Its Post War Legacy (München: Iudicium, 1997), 49–63; Victor J.
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role on the Indian subcontinent, too—as is evident from the quote above—is
less understood. Aside from two descriptive monographs dating back to the
1970s, there has been relatively little scholarly engagement with this phenom-
enon.3 In this article, we would like to offer an overview of several distinct con-
cepts of Asia and pan-Asian designs, which featured prominently in both
political and civil society debates in India during the struggle for Independence.
Considering the abundance of initiatives for Asian unification, and, in a more
abstract sense, discourses on Asian identity, what follows here is necessarily a
selection of discourses, three of which will be subjected to critical analysis,
with the following questions in mind:
• What were the concrete motives of regional—in this case Indian—actors to appro-
priate the concept of Asianism? Is the popularity of supranational frames of reference
solely to be explained as an affirmation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis the imagined
powerful West, or are there other motives to be found?
• What were the results of these processes of appropriation, and how were these man-
ifested politically and culturally?
• What tensions resulted from the simultaneous existence of various nationalisms in
Asia on the one hand and macro-nationalistic pan-Asianism on the other?
An important theoretical tool in the engagement with Indian Asianisms is
provided by Prasenjit Duara, who has analyzed the interrelations between the
expansion of anti-colonial nationalism and the transformation of concepts of
civilization after the First World War.4 He argues that over the course of the
nineteenth century the only accepted criteria for being “civilized” and for re-
cognition of national sovereignty as such, had come to consist of the values
of Christianity and Enlightenment. “Civilization” (with a capital C) was under-
stood to be both singular and universal. In the late 1900s, the rhetoric of an
Koschmann, “Asianism’s Ambivalent Legacy,” in P. J. Katzenstein und Takashi Shiraishi, eds.,
Network Power: Japan and Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Peter Duus, “Imperi-
alism without Colonies: The Vision of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” Diplomacy and
Statecraft 7, 1 (1996): 54–72.
3 Birendra Prasad, Indian Nationalism and Asia (1900–1947) (Delhi: B. R. Publishing Corpor-
ation, 1979); and Stephen Hay, Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan,
China, and India (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). See also: T. A. Keenleyside,
“Nationalist Indian Attitudes towards Asia: A Troublesome Legacy for Post-Independence Indian
Foreign Policy,” Pacific Affairs 55, 2 (1982): 210–30; and Miroslav Krása, “The Idea of
Pan-Asianism and the Nationalist Movement in India,” Archiv Orientálni 40 (1972): 38–60. For
the resurgence of Asianist discourses in India since the 1990s, see Christophe Jaffrelot, “India’s
Look East Policy: An Asianist Strategy in Perspective,” Indian Review 2, 2 (2003): 35–68. An
excellent recent contribution, which unfortunately reached the authors too late for a thorough
response, is Mark Frost, “‘That Great Ocean of Idealism’: Calcutta, the Tagore Circle and the
Idea of Asia, 1900–1920,” in S. Moorthy and A. Jamal, eds., Indian Ocean Studies: Cultural,
Social and Political Perspectives (New York and London: Routledge, 2010), 251–79.
4 Prasenjit Duara, “The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism,” Journal of World History
12 (2001): 99–130; and Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern
(Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). See also G. W. Gong, The Standard of Civilization in
International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).
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imperial “civilizing mission” of the West became the single most important
legitimation for colonial exploitation.5 However, this changed after the
seminal catastrophe of the First World War, and an alternative understanding
of civilization in a Spenglerian sense arose6: “An alternative discourse of civi-
lization as multiple, spiritual, and moral … that had survived in the penumbra
of the singular Civilization, received an important fillip towards the end of the
war.… Western Civilization had forfeited the right to represent the highest
goals of humanity, and the new national movements sought to turn towards
their own civilizational traditions—often reconstructed in the image of Civili-
zation—to found the ideals of the new nations and the right to sovereignty.”7
Through these complex interrelations between the postulates of nationalism
and the transnational concept of civilization, says Duara, tensions and conflicts
of loyalty are inherent in these new civilizational concepts.
In addition, Sugata Bose has examined the role of extraterritorial identity
and universalist aspiration among the people of the Indian Ocean in the age of
global empire.8 He demonstrates that the dreams and goals of the colonized
were never fully constrained by the borders of colonial states. Nationalism
and universalism, far from being in an adversarial relationship, were bound
in a strong symbiotic embrace.9 Anti-colonialism as an ideology was both teth-
ered to the idea of homeland and, paradoxically, strengthened by extraterritorial
affiliations. This, he maintains, is a powerful political theme, the importance of
which has not been grasped by political theorists and historians obsessed with
territorial nationalism.10 Using examples such as those of “expatriate patriots,”
pilgrimage networks, and Islamic universalism, he demonstrates that there
were, in fact, many transterritorial aspects to the “nation in formation.” This
view is supported by several other theorists of both internationalism and trans-
nationalism, who maintain that these phenomena do transgress but do not
5 See also Jürgen Osterhammel, “The Great Work of Uplifting Mankind: Zivilisierungsmission
und Moderne,” in B. Barth and J. Osterhammel, eds., Zivilisierungsmissionen: Imperiale Weltver-
besserung seit dem 18. Jahrhundert (Konstanz: UVK, 2005), 335–425; Duncan Bell, The Idea of
Greater Britain Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900 (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2007), 202–6; Michael Mann, “Torchbearers upon the Path of Progress—Britain’s Ideol-
ogy of ‘Material and Moral Progress’ in India: An Introductory Essay,” in H. Fischer-Tiné und M.
Mann, eds., Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India (London:
Anthem Press, 2004), 1–26; Andrew Sartori, “The Resonance of ‘Culture’: Framing a Problem
in Global Concept-History,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 47, 4 (2005): 676–99.
6 Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Welt-
geschichte, 2 Bde. (München: C. H. Beck, 1923). See also John Farrenkopf, “Spengler’s Historical
Pessimism and the Tragedy of Our Age,” Theory and Society 22, 3 (1993): 391–412.
7 Prasenjit Duara, “The Imperialism of ‘Free Nations’: Japan, Manchukuo, and the History of the
Present,” in A. L. Stoler, C. McGranahan, and P. C. Perdue, eds., Imperial Formations (Santa Fe, N.
Mex.: School for Advanced Research Press, 2007), 214.
8 S. Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).
9 Ibid., 31.
10 Ibid., 68.
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subvert the nation-state.11 It is with considerable frequency, for instance, that
one encounters anti-imperialists whose plans for India and the world included
transnational ingredients that were at least as important as nationalism and,
indeed, frequently overshadowed it. The applicability of these observations
to our Indian case study is best illustrated by a chronological overview of
India’s engagement with Asia. We will then examine three Asianist discourses
in greater detail.
I M A G I N I N G A S I A I N I N D I A : A C H R O NO L O G I C A L S K E T C H
From the mid-nineteenth century onward, references to other Asian states and
regions surface in the emerging Indian public sphere.12 From the opening
decade of the twentieth century, these transform into more tangible transna-
tional networks and initiatives to promote Asian unity in various shapes and
forms. Importantly, these initiatives, ranging from fairly unself-conscious invo-
cations of Asian identity to highly articulate pan-Asian projects, cut across the
full spectrum of religious and political currents on the subcontinent.
Early Asianism: The Unity of Asian Civilization
One of the first Indian thinkers to formulate a marked concept of Asia in the
sense of Prasenjit Duara’s “civilization” was the Bengali Hindu reformer
Keshab Chandra Sen (1838–1884).13 In his 1883 speech with the programmatic
title “Asia’s Message to Europe” he states: “We have indeed learnt a great deal
from the West … but Europe too must learn of Asia. Who can deny the deep
idealism and the lofty spirituality of the East? The marvellous and almost
incredible ease with which Asiatic seers have always communed with the
Eternal Spirit, gives the lie to the dictum that God is unknowable. Wilt thou,
Europe, take away from us our soul substance? Thou shalt not do it. In this
sceptical age, Asia must preach with thundering eloquence the Gospel of the
Living and Knowable God.… It is un-Asiatic not to know God.”14 The
11 See, for example: T. Brennan, “Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism,” in D. Archibugi, ed.,
Debating Cosmopolitics (London: Verso, 2003), 40–50; Prasenjit Duara, “Transnationalism and the
Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900–1945,” American Historical Review 102, 4 (Oct. 1997):
1030–51; P. Cheah, “Given Culture: Rethinking Cosmopolitical Freedom in Transnationalism,”
Boundary 2 24, 2 (Summer 1997): 157–97.
12 See, for instance, the poetry of the renowned Bengali writer Hem Chandra Bannerjee from the
1870s. Prasad, Indian Nationalism, 26–27.
13 Frans Damen, Crisis and Religious Renewal in the Brahmo Samaj: A Study of the New Dis-
pensation under Keshab Chandra Sen (Leuven: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1983); and David
Kopf, The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1979). For a short discussion of Keshabs concept of Asia: Birendra Prasad, “Keshab
Chandra Sen: Prophet of Pan Asianism,” Quarterly Review of Historical Studies 15, 2 (1975–
1976): 122–25.
14 T. E. Slater, Keshab Chandra Sen and the Brahma Samaj: Being a Brief Review of Indian
Theism from 1830 to 1884; Together with Selections from Mr. Sen’s Works (Madras: Society for
the Promotion of Christian Knowledge, 1884), 135.
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discursive strategy, which is often called “self-orientalization,”15 is clearly
visible in Sen’s phrasing. In line with prevalent Orientalist stereotypes, a peace-
making and placid Asia is contrasted with a materialistic and menacing Europe.
This leitmotiv would later permeate most (but not all) Indian concepts of Asia.
An important platform for the global promulgation of East-West stereo-
types was the World Parliament of Religions, held in Chicago in 1893 in the
context of the World Exhibition.16 The Parliament offered a unique forum
for the representatives of Asian religions to reach a Western audience. At the
same time it was a space for encounters and communication between Asian
actors themselves, to be consolidated by future transnational cooperation. P. C.
Majumdar, representative of the Hindu reformist Brahmo Samaj,17 Gyanendra-
nath Chakravarti from the Indian Theosophical Society, and the self-appointed
representative of “orthodox” Hinduism, Swami Vivekananda,18 all enthusiasti-
cally subscribed to the binary East-West cliché. Vivekananda undoubtedly had
the greatest impact. He identified Asia, and especially India, by its inherent spiri-
tuality, as the antithesis to the highly mechanized but soulless West. He was one
of the first Indian intellectuals to build bridges between Asian neighbors: on the
way to Chicago, Vivekananda visited Japan and speculated openly about a
common future for Asian peoples.19 His model of division-of-labor, whereby
the West would take care of the material development of the world and the
East of its spiritual edification, had substantial influence on the Bengali Nobel
Prize laureate Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), who will be treated below.
Development of Asianism into a Pan-Movement
The Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 gave Asianist
thought a completely new direction. The triumph of the Japanese army over a
15 Arif Dirlik, “Chinese History and the Question of Orientalism,” History and Theory, 35, 2
(1996): 96–118.
16 Dorothea Lüddeckens, Das Weltparlament der Religionen von 1893. Strukturen interreligiö-
ser Begegnung im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin-New York: De Gruyter, 2002); and Richard Hughes
Seager, The World’s Parliament of Religions: The East/West Encounter, Chicago 1893 (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1995).
17 See Pratapchandra Majumdar, The World’s Religious Debt to Asia. Being the Substance of an
Address Delivered at the Parliament of Religions, Chicago (Lahore: Punjab Brahmo Samaj, 1894).
18 The speeches of Vivekananda at this forum are printed in The Complete Works of Swami Vive-
kananda (Almora, 1955), vol. I, 1–22; and Rev. John Henry Barrows, ed., The World’s Parliament
of Religions. An Interesting and Popular Story of the World’s First Parliament of Religions Held in
Chicago in Connection with the Columbian Exhibition of 1893 (Chicago: Parliament Publishing
Co., 1893), vol. I., 102, and vol. II., 968–78. A good analysis is found in Brian A. Hatcher, Eclecti-
cism and Modern Hindu Discourse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 47–70; and Indira
Chowdhury-Sengupta, “Reconstructing Hinduism on a World Platform: The World’s First Parlia-
ment of Religions, Chicago 1893,” in William Radice, ed., Swami Vivekananda and the Modern-
isation of Hinduism (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), 17–35.
19 Vivekananda, “The Abroad and the Problems at Home,” in The Complete Works of Swami
Vivekananda (Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1979), vol. V, 209–10.
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European opponent crushed not only the widely held belief of the “natural”
superiority of the white “race”; it also demonstrated to Asia the formidable
achievements in modernization by Meiji Japan. For many Indian nationalists,
Japan became the forerunner of an alternative Asian modernity.20 Thus,
between 1906 and 1914, a growing number of patriotic young Indians
decided to spend their education abroad in Tokyo instead of at a prestigious
European or American university.21 At the same time, a series of radical
Indian nationalists found their way to this city, where they tried, mostly by
appealing to pan-Asian solidarity, to win Japanese support for the Indian
freedom struggle.22 However, Indian students were frequently discriminated
against by the Japanese public23 and, not least because of Japan’s ties with
Great Britain,24 official response to such appeals for support was lukewarm.
Nevertheless, the Indian press already speculated about the formation of an
Asian association of states under Japanese leadership.25 Prominent leaders of
the Indian National Congress (INC) took up an Asianist agenda, including
the wish to turn the perceived “fundamental unity of India, China, and
Japan” into the basis of a successful struggle against the cultural hegemony
of the West.26 A group of radical Indian revolutionaries-in-exile in Paris had
still further-reaching visions. In 1909, they published a call to establish a
pan-Asian parliament in the French capital to promote political and military
20 T. R. Sareen, “India and the War,” in Rotem Kowner, ed., The Impact of the Russo-Japanese
War (London: Routledge, 2007), 239–50; Gita Dharampal-Frick, “Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg
und die indische Nationalbewegung,” in M. H. Sprotte, W. Seifert, and H. D. Löwe, eds., Der
Russisch-Japanische Krieg 1904/05: Anbruch einer neuen Zeit? (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz
Verlag, 2007), 259–76; and R. P. Dua, The Impact of the Russo-Japanese (1905) War on Indian
Politics (Delhi: S. Chand, 1966).
21 Their numbers rose from fifty-four in 1906 to well over a hundred in 1910. Harald Fischer-
Tiné, “Indian Nationalism and the ‘World Forces’: Transnational and Diasporic Dimensions of the
Indian Freedom Movement on the Eve of the First World War,” Journal of Global History 2, 3
(2007): 325–44, here 336.
22 Fischer-Tiné, “Indian Nationalism,” 341–43; Yukiko Sumi Barnett, “India in Asia: Okawa
Shûmei’s Pan-Asian Thought and His Idea of India in Early Twentieth-Century Japan,” Journal
of the Oxford University History Society 1 (2004): 1–23, here 6–9; and Aydin, Politics of Anti-
Westernism, 113–21. See also Arun Coomer Bose, Indian Revolutionaries Abroad, 1905–1922:
In the Background of International Developments (Patna: Bharati Bhawan, 1971), 67–81; and
T. R. Sareen, Indian Revolutionaries, Japan and British Imperialism (New Delhi: Anmol, 1993).
23 British Library, Asia, Africa and Pacific Collection, India Office Records (henceforth APAC,
IOR), Pos 8959, Government of India, Home Department, Political Proceedings (B) 24 (July 1907–
Sept. 1908), Prog. 145, “Weekly Report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence for the Week
Ending July 27th 1907.” The Report quotes the letter sent by an Indian student in Japan. The
writer complains that the thirty-five Indian students in Tokyo “have to face great difficulties,”
not least because, “Japanese do not hesitate to treat them with contempt.”
24 See also Antony Best, “India, Pan-Asianism and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,” in P. O’Brien,
ed., The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902–1922 (London: Routledge, 2004), 236–48.
25 Prasad, Indian Nationalism, 47.
26 Irving S. Friedman, “Indian Nationalism and the Far East,” Pacific Affairs 13, 1 (1940): 17–
29, here 18. See also Lala Lajpat Rai, Young India: An Interpretation and a History of the Nation-
alist Movement from Within (London: Home Rule for India League, 1917).
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Asian unity against the domination of the European imperial powers: “There
are educated Indians, Osmanlis, Egyptians, Japanese, Chinese, Arabs, Arme-
nians, Parsis, Persians, Siamese, and others to be found at Paris. A pan-Asian
Parliament could be easily organized, which would co-ordinate the ambition
and polity of an Emancipated East. […] a few keen brains on the Seine
could marshal in array the swords of Eight Hundred Millions. Asia has sat
too long in darkness and in the shadow of death. Let Asia arise in Unity and
Unity will bring Might.”27 Japan’s ascent to intra-Asian colonial power soon
dampened pan-Asianist aspirations in India. The annexation of Korea and
the imposition of the “21 demands” on China in 1915, particularly, led to dis-
illusionment with Japan and resulted in a partial transfer of attention to India’s
direct neighbor: China.28 After the Japanese aggression in Manchuria and its
attack on China, this transfer reached its zenith in the 1930s.29
However, there was no clear break in India’s engagement with Japan,
nor a complete reorientation towards China. While Japanese imperialism was
generally condemned, and solidarity with the Chinese professed,30 there
were some notable exceptions. Japan remained Asia’s strongest power and
still served as an influential model of modernity. Japanese good-will missions
continued to seek and find audiences in India,31 and their views on Asia
did find their way to the Indian press,32 often through the mediation of the
Indian-born, but naturalized Japanese revolutionary Rashbehari Bose, who
published his own monthly journal, New Asia.33 The Indian community in
Japan formed an important bridge in this respect, and its most prominent
members attended the inauguration of the Great Asia Association in Kobe
in 1938.34
27 “A Suggestion for a Pan-Asian Union in Paris,” Indian Sociologist 5, 4 (1909): 16.
28 Prasad, Indian Nationalism, 94; and S. R. Mehrotra, “The Development of the Indian Outlook
on World Affairs before 1947,” Journal of Development Studies 1, 3 (1965): 269–94, here 280.
29 Madhavi Thampi, Indians in China 1800–1949 (New Delhi: Manohar, 2005), 200. See also
Prasad, Indian Nationalism, 151–74.
30 Among other things, this solidarity found expression in the sending of a medical mission to
China, received by one Hengchi Tao with the following words: “These Angels of Mercy have in
their hands not only the cure for the wounded but also love to bind together the hearts of these
two great nations.” Harijan, 22 Oct. 1938: 296.
31 For instance T. Kurose, who enlisted the support of many Bengali youths in Calcutta. APAC,
IOR, L/PJ/12/158, Weekly Intelligence Report, 3 Dec. 1938.
32 The Indo-Japanese Society in Calcutta co-funded a monthly review to highlight the “Asiatic”
and “anti-European side” of Japan’s policy. Other examples include: “A Japanese Visitor,”Harijan,
24 Dec. 1938: 404; Japanese Professor T. Kurose, in the Singh Observer, Dec. 1938: n.p.; and the
Tagore-Noguchi correspondence published in both Amrita Bazar Patrika and Visva Bharati Quar-
terly in September 1938.
33 At the subscription rate of 1 yen, a price probably aimed at both a wide circulation and a
student readership. APAC, IOR, L/PJ/12/163, on Rash Behari Bose, British Embassy Tokyo, 31
May 1933.
34 IOR, L/PJ/12/158, British Consulate General at Kobe, 30 Sept. 1938.
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Imagining India in Central and Western Asia
In spite of the increasingly ambiguous relationship with Japan, the conception
of Asia in accordance with the principle of self-determination, as formulated by
both Lenin and Wilson, found further impetus on the Indian subcontinent after
the First WorldWar.35 As early as 1918, Aga Khan III, the politically influential
religious leader of the Ismaili Muslims, proposed the creation of a south- and
west-Asian union.36 The case of the Aga Khan demonstrates the versatility
of the concept of Asianism. He vehemently rejected any suggestion of
tension between his multiple identities as a Muslim, an Indian, and an Asian.
Both as India’s chief delegate to the League of Nations and president of the
Muslim League in the 1930s, he was able to express his views on a wide
array of Asian concerns. As a delegate, he propagated mediation between
China and Japan in the early 1930s, repeatedly confirming India’s ancient
ties with both countries, invoking both Buddhism and Islam as unifying
factors: “China is our good neighbour … and with her province of Turkestan
we have had, since time immemorial, friendly cultural and economic
relations.… Just as the Indian Buddha has influenced Chinese and Japanese
thought, so the great Confucius has left his living and eternal mark on
India.”37 His appropriation of the topos of “ancient bonds,” so often used for
countries to the east of India, enabled him to form a more inclusive concept
of Asia: “The whole world knows the long and intimate spiritual, cultural
and economic relations between India and the lands that to-day form the
Kingdom of Iraq.”38 When Afghanistan was admitted into the League, he pro-
claimed “no representative of India, no Muslim, no Asiatic could play his part
in this historic occasion unmoved.”39 In this way, he synthesized India’s
35 For a general account, see Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment. Self-Determination and the
International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); and
Erez Manela, “Imagining WoodrowWilson in Asia: Dreams of East-West Harmony and the Revolt
against Empire in 1919,” American Historical Review 111, 6 (2006): 1327–52.
36 Keenleyside, “Nationalist Indian Attitudes,” 217. As Cemil Aydin has recently demonstrated,
this was emphatically not the only attempt to combine pan-Islamism and pan-Asianism. Aydin,
Politics of Anti-Westernism, passim. See also Selçuk Esenbel, “Japan’s Global Claim to Asia and
theWorld of Islam: Transnational Nationalism andWorld Power, 1900–1945,” American Historical
Review 109, 4 (2004): 1140–70.
37 “Speech at the Special Session of the League of Nations, Geneva, 8 March 1932,” in K. K.
Aziz, ed., Aga Khan III: Selected Speeches and Writings of Sir Sultan Muhammad Shah, Vol. II:
1928–1955 (London: Routledge, 1997), 900–1.
38 “Speech in the General Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva, 3 October 1932,” in
idem, 911. This sentiment is echoed in both Kalidas Nag’s writings on Aryan civilization in
Central Asia and Tagore’s sojourn in Persia and Iraq (1932), where he, too, emphasized the
ancient linkages of both these countries to India. See Rabindranath Tagore, Journey to Persia
and Iraq (Santiniketan: Visva Bharati, 1994).
39 “Speech, General Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva, 27 September 1934,” in K. K.
Aziz, ed., Aga Khan III: Selected Speeches and Writings of Sir Sultan Muhammad Shah, Vol. II:
1928–1955 (London: Routledge, 1997), 1039.
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religious and cultural variety and redirected it into one single occasion for joy:
“For India, however much she may seek from theWest her political institutions,
remains a true daughter of the East, proud of her Eastern blood, her Eastern
languages, her Eastern cultures. These she shares with Afghanistan, and
seventy million of her peoples share, as I share, with Afghanistan in the glor-
ious brotherhood of Islam.”40
While a detailed description of this specific variety of Asianism would
exceed the scope of this article, it must be noted that several South Asian dis-
courses are generally overlooked in this context. The Khilafat movement41
should be mentioned in this respect. It brought forth a variety of bulletins in
Urdu and English with sizeable circulations.42 The English-language Khilafat
Bulletin, for instance, used the presses of the Bombay Chronicle to call for
Asian unity under the banner of Islam.43 Nor was the Khilafat movement
restricted to South Asian Muslims. It was Gandhi who first voiced Congress
support to the movement, partly in an effort to incorporate the Indian
Muslims into All-India nationalism.44 Carved-up Turkey became a symbol
for the imperialist dismemberment of Asia, and M. A. Ansari firmly put the
Khilafat movement into the realm of pan-Asianism when he said: “It is, there-
fore, not only a question of India’s honour and freedom, but of a great struggle
for the emancipation of all the enslaved Asiatic peoples from the thraldom of
the West.”45
Building Institutions
In the INC, explicit Asianist tendencies can be found early on. In 1921, the
possible foundation of an Asian Federation was discussed at the annual
meeting of the Indian National Congress.46 INC President Chittaranjan Das
was convinced that “such a bond of friendship and love, of sympathy and
cooperation, between India and the rest of Asia … is destined to bring about
40 Ibid., 1040.
41 For accounts of the Khilafat movement in India and its ties to (Pan-)Islamism in a wider sense,
see Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982); Mushirul Hasan and Margrit Pernau, eds., Regionalizing
Pan-Islamism: Documents on the Khilafat Movement (Delhi: Manohar, 2005); M. Naeem
Qureshi, Pan-Islam in British-Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement 1918–1924
(Leiden: Brill, 1999); M. Hasan, Pan-Islam versus Indian Nationalism: A Reappraisal (New
Delhi: Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, 1995); A. Özcan, Pan-Islamism, Indian Muslims,
the Ottomans and Britain 1877–1924 (Leiden: Brill, 1997).
42 Examples of these bulletins are the Urdu-language Khilafat-I ‘Usmaniyya (a weekly, later
continued as a daily under the name Khilafat), or the English weekly Khilafat Bulletin.
43 Editorial, Khilafat Bulletin (published by the Central Khilafat Committee of India, Bombay),
11 Aug. 1922: 2.
44 For an excellent account of the Khilafat movement and Congress, see M. Naeem Qureshi,
Pan-Islam in British-Indian Politics.
45 M. Hasan, Pan-Islamism, XXVI, Sept. 1985, 10.
46 Krása, “The Idea of Pan-Asianism,” 246.
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world peace.”47 Both the delegates and the general press welcomed his idea,
but concrete steps towards its execution failed to materialize. This is not
entirely surprising given that even Jawarlahal Nehru, as the Congress’ most
enthusiastic proponent of Asian relations, had his doubts. When the proposal
was tabled again, he wrote to his friend and revolutionary-in-exile Virendranath
Chattopadyaya48: “The Congress passed a resolution about summoning a
Pan-Asiatic conference in India in 1930. Nobody quite understands what this
means.… I doubt if it is at all possible to hold any such gathering in India.”49
Although Nehru proved to be right, at least for the moment, tangible
impulses for regional cooperation did manifest themselves at the World Con-
gress of Oppressed Peoples held in 1927 in Brussels, which founded the
League Against Imperialism, and in which Nehru participated as representative
of the INC.50 Like the World Parliament of Religions thirty-five years before,
the Congress offered a platform for the creation of international contacts. This
time, however, the participants were not religious dignitaries but political
leaders who mingled and forged alliances. A separate meeting of several
Asian delegates was held, at which the founding of a pan-Asian organization
was discussed once more,51 and the meeting resolved to “undertake all necess-
ary action, to free Asia from Imperialism and Colonial Oppression.”52
In this particular case, international communism provided a particularly
salient framework for linking anti-imperial forces in Asia, and several of the
League’s organizers were in touch with the Communist International (Comin-
tern). Other avenues for Asian cooperation were the Pan-Pacific Trade Union
Secretariat founded by Profintern, the Asian wing of the Comintern, and its
Bureau of Transport Workers of the Pacific. The Communist section of the
All-India Trade Union Congress was in touch with the former and had a seat
on the latter.53 At the other end of the political spectrum, the 1930s opened
47 Ibid. See also Banerji, Asianism and other Essays.
48 Virendranath Chattopadhyaya was a revolutionary in exile, who succeeded M. N. Roy to the
Indian leadership of the Comintern. At the time, Chattopadhyaya was the League Against Imperi-
alism’s secretary in Germany. For biographical details, see Nirode K. Barooah, The Life and Times
of an Indian Anti-Imperialist in Europe (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004).
49 Nehru to Chattopadhyaya, 16 Jan. 1929, P. C. Joshi Archives, Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi, LAI file 7.
50 Bakar Ali Mirza, “The Congress against Imperialism,” Modern Review 11, 5 (May 1927):
555–66.
51 Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1959),
109–10.
52 Joint Resolution by the Asian Delegations, International Institute for Social History, League
Against Imperialism Archives, file 28.
53 Membership of the former was blocked by moderate sections in the All-India Trade Union
Congress, but India received a seat on the latter. X. J. Eudin and R. C. North, Soviet Russia and
the East, 1920–1927: A Documentary Survey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), 268.
See also J. Fowler, “From East to West and West to East: Ties of Solidarity in the Pan-Pacific Revo-
lutionary Trade Union Movement, 1923–1934,” International Labour and Working Class History
66 (2004): 99–117.
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avenues for Asian collaboration within the context of fascism. This develop-
ment reached its zenith in December 1933, when the Italian Institute for the
Middle and Far East organized an Asiatic Congress in Rome.54 A sizeable
Indian delegation attended this conference, of which Pramatha Nath Roy, for-
merly a lecturer in Italian at Calcutta University, and Subhas Chandra Bose, of
later Indian National Army (INA) fame, took an especially active part.55 Out of
this conference emerged an Oriental Students Confederation, but this organiz-
ation was short-lived. However, Subhas Chandra Bose’s European connections
proved useful when he made his way to Germany and Italy in1941 before con-
tinuing on to Japanese-occupied Southeast Asia, recruiting Indian war prison-
ers and laborers into the INAwith the intent to fight alongside the Japanese and
liberate India from the British.56
Eventually, this spirit of Asianism, having swept the continent during the
interwar period, found expression after the Second World War in a series of
Asian Conferences that were replete with the rhetoric of pan-Asianism, and
confirmed the existence of an Asian identity and the need to jointly fight
imperialism anywhere in Asia. India aspired to take a leading part in this, as
evidenced by dailies’ headlines such as, “India’s Emergence as Leader of
Asia,”57 and “Nehru Leads Asia against Foreign Aggression.”58 The first con-
ference in New Delhi in March and April 1947, according to G. H. Jansen,
“marked the apex of Asianism, for never again was there such a gushing
outflow of the Asian spirit.”59 Asian conferences followed in rapid succession,
culminating in the Bandung Conference of 1955.
C OM P E T I N G D I S C O U R S E S O F A S I A
Having presented this short outline of the development of pan-Asianist enthu-
siasm in India, we now turn to three examples of pan-Asianist rhetoric to
explore the discursive strategies in more detail. We selected these discourses
on the basis of shared features that allow for a more in-depth treatment: all
54 For details, see Mario Prayer, “Italian Fascist Regime and Nationalist India, 1921–45,” Inter-
national Studies 28, 3 (1991): 249–71; Valdo Ferretti: “Politica e cultura: origini e attività dell’Is-
Meo durante il regime fascista,” Storia contemporanea 17, 5 (1986): 779–819.
55 Memorandum on the Asiatic Congress in Rome, 22–27 Dec. 1933, APAC, IOR, P&J/12/475.
56 Several prominent Indian pan-Asianists living in Japan were also part of the INA, such as
A. M. Sahay and R. B. Bose, and as a movement it had its pedigree in pan-Asian thought.
However, extensive treatment of the INA falls outside of our chronological and thematic scope
here. For details, see S. K. Bose, A Beacon across Asia: A Biography of Subhas Chandra Bose
(Bombay: Orient Longman, 1973); S. S. Gupta, Our Struggle and Rash Behari Bose (Calcutta:
Books of the World, 1951); J. G. Oshawa, Two Great Indians in Japan: Shri Rash Behari Bose
and Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose (Calcutta: Kusa Publications, 1954); P. S. Ramu, Rash Behari
Bose: A Revolutionary “Unwept, Unhonoured and Unsung” (New Delhi: The FreedomMovement
Memorial Committee, 1998).
57 Bombay Chronicle, 12 Mar. 1947.
58 Bombay Chronicle, 21 Jan. 1949.
59 G. H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (London: Faber, 1966), 51.
I M A G I N I N G A S I A I N I N D I A 75
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417511000594
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 13:53:38, subject to the Cambridge Core
were developed on the subcontinent in the tumultuous years between 1905 and
1930, and all had their origins in Bengal.60 Despite these regional foundations,
all three soon developed into pan-Indian, partly even global movements for
Asia.
Asia as the Spiritual Antithesis of Europe: The Message of
Rabindranath Tagore
Conjuring up Asian spirituality not only has a long history; it is also a topos that
had its origins in the West. European travelers, missionaries, Orientalists, phi-
losophers, and poets had constructed Asia since the late seventeenth century as
the spiritual counterpart of Europe.61 While we cannot provide here an in-depth
treatment of European images of Asia, it should be noted that even before the
century’s turn the Theosophical Society popularized this topos through its inter-
national network of branches and its various publications not only within India
but also globally. The Society’s veneration of the allegedly “spiritual East” as
opposed to the “materialist West” was informed by the textualized approach to
Asia of “romantic Orientalists” such as William Jones and the earlier German
romantic tradition.62 While Eur-American members of the Society used the
East-West cliché for an inner-civilizational critique, Asian affiliates such as
the theosophical delegate to the World Parliament of Religions, Gyanendranath
Chakravarti, later employed it for their own specific agendas, as did Gandhi.63
The cases of Chakravarti and Gandhi exemplify how successfully the Theoso-
phical Society as a globally recognized platform mediated this cliché between
Eur-America and Asia.
Hindu-reformers like Keshab Chandra Sen and Vivekananda also fell back
on this well-established myth. In the case of Tagore too, Western mediation was
involved; he corresponded intensively with the Irish devotee to Hinduism
60 All three discourses have wielded considerable influence, but it is not argued here that they
were the only or main architects of Indian pan-Asianism; other strong influences, besides the devel-
opments traced above, include the substantial interaction between South India and Southeast Asia,
North India and Central Asia, Buddhist revivalism, networks of lascars, revolutionaries, and many
others.
61 See Jürgen Osterhammel, Die Entzauberung Asiens: Europa und die asiatischen Reiche im
18. Jahrhundert (München: C. H. Beck Verlag, 1998); Kate Teltscher, India Inscribed: European
and British Writing on India 1600–1800 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995).
62 Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and “the Mystic East”
(London: Routledge, 1999), 141–42; and Mark Bevir, “The West Turns Eastward: Madame Bla-
vatsky and the Transformation of the Occult Tradition,” Journal of the American Academy of Reli-
gion 62, 3 (1994): 747–67. On the political engagement of the Theosophical Society in India, by the
same author, see “Theosophy as a Political Movement,” in Antony Copley, ed., Gurus and Their
Followers: New Religious Reform Movements in Colonial India (New Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 2000).
63 For Gandhi’s involvement with theosophical ideas, see Michael Bergunder, “Gandhi, Esoterik
und das Christentum,” in Michael Bergunder and Daniel Cyranka, eds., Esoterik und das Christen-
tum: Religionsgeschichtliche und theologische Perspektiven (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt,
2005), 129–48.
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Margaret Noble, who was also in touch with Japan’s prophet of pan-Asianism,
Okakura Tenshin (1863–1916).64 Okakura visited India in 1901 and 1902, on
which voyage he met both Vivekananda and the celebrated man of letters
Rabindranath Tagore.65 One year later he published a book entitled Ideals of
the East, the first sentence of which drove his point home so poignantly that
it would later become a sort of mantra for Asianists of various persuasions:
Asia is one.66
Like many other English-educated intellectuals, Tagore was highly recep-
tive to such a message, which heralded the spiritual greatness and unity of Asia.
All the more so when the harbinger of this imagined Asian interconnectedness
came from soaring and uncolonized Japan. The Bengali poet stayed in touch
with Okakura until the latter’s death in 1913, and made Japan the focal point
of his attempts to establish a collective Asian identity. He visited the country
thrice between 1916 and 1929. After he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Lit-
erature in 1913, Tagore’s fame allowed him to act as the mouthpiece of the
intellectual and political elites of his country. In “The Message of India to
Japan,” a speech delivered during his first visit to the Imperial University of
Tokyo,67 he succinctly explained his vision of Asia. He argued that, at a
time when the West was still barbaric, a blossoming civilization had existed,
which united the whole of Asia from India to Japan, and “which was not pol-
itical but social, not predatory and mechanically efficient but spiritual.”68 Sec-
ondly, he portrayed the soulless, materialistic West as an existential threat to
Asian peoples: the appropriation of European modernity should occur only
highly selectively and under permanent consideration of one’s own cultural
heritage. Finally, he supported the view that the secularized West could not
reform itself from the inside. This world-historical role was reserved for
Asia, and especially for its emerging leading power, Japan: to re-spiritualize
the shallow and self-destructive Western civilization and, in so doing, to
finally save the world itself from destruction. The continuity with Vivekanan-
da’s concept of a division-of-labor between East and West is clearly visible
here.69 He appealed to the Japanese elites to distinguish themselves clearly
from the West, and to refuse those acquisitions of “European modernity” that
64 Rustom Bharucha, Another Asia: Rabindranath Tagore and Okakura Tenshin (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2006).
65 The best biography still is Krishna Dutta and Andrew Robinson’s Rabindranath Tagore: The
Myriad Minded Man (London: Bloomsbury, 1995).
66 Okakura Kakuzo, The Ideals of the East: With Special Reference to the Art of Japan (London:
John Murray, 1904).
67 A reworked version was soon published in English: Rabindranath Tagore, Nationalism
(London: Macmillan, 1917).
68 Cited in Hay, Asian Ideas, 64.
69 Harald Fischer-Tiné, “‘Deep Occidentalism’?—Europa und der Westen in der Wahrnehmung
hinduistischer Intellektueller und Reformer (ca. 1890–1930),” Journal of Modern European
History 4, 2 (2006): 189–94.
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might have a dubious impact70: “Of all countries in Asia, here in Japan
you have the freedom to use the materials you have gathered from the West
according to your genius and to your need. Therefore your responsibility is
all the greater, for in your voice Asia shall answer the questions that Europe
has submitted to the conference of Man. In your land the experiments will
be carried on by which the East will change the aspects of modern civilization,
infusing life in it where it is a machine, substituting the human heart for cold
expediency, not caring so much for power and success but for harmonious
living.”71
This skepticism vis-à-vis the modern, which was a central part of Tagore’s
Asianism, was received as reluctantly in self-conscious Taishō-Japan as were
his universalist fantasies of an Asia whose raison d’être it was to save the
world. Especially criticized in the Japanese public sphere was Tagore’s simul-
taneous critique of Japanese nationalism and imperialism—he viewed both as
“satanic excesses of the West” with no roots in Asia.72 His “unrealistic anti-
modernism” and “naïve pacifism” showed, according to his critics, that he rep-
resented a subjected, humiliated nation.73 On his later visits to Japan, too, the
response was mixed. During his second in 1924, he trashed the Japanese aspira-
tions to become a great power in scarcely concealed words: “I have come to
warn you in Japan, the country where I wrote my first lectures against Nation-
alism at a time when people laughed my ideas to scorn.… Let Japan find her
own true mind, which will not merely accept lessons from others, but will
create a world of her own, which will be generous in its gift to all humanity.
Make all other people of Asia proud in their acknowledgement of your great-
ness, which is not based on the enslavement of victims [and] upon the accumu-
lation of material wealth.”74
The reactions of his Japanese hosts were as cool this time as they had been
eight years earlier. He fared even worse during his short tour of China that same
year, especially with the younger generation, and was booed off the stage by
70 It must be noted that for all his essentializing of Asia and the “Asian mentality,” Tagore
remained a cosmopolitan to the end, cautioning repeatedly against full denial of the West, which
he also recognized to have spiritual traditions. See Louise B. Williams, “Overcoming the Contagion
of Mimicry: The Cosmopolitan Nationalism and Modernist History of Rabindranath Tagore and
W. B. Yeats,” American Historical Review 112, 1 (2007): 69–100; and Bharucha, Another Asia,
94–98.
71 Tagore, Nationalism, 59.
72 The Bengali Nobel Prize laureate was convinced that Japan, after it had overcome the “sick-
ness” of westernization, would come into its own true Asian Self and rediscover spirituality and
non-violence. Only after the Japanese invasion of China did Tagore find himself forced to
rethink his optimism. See Rabindranath Tagore, “A Letter to an Indian Friend in Japan,” Modern
Review 63, 6 (1938), 622–26, here 623–24.
73 Hay, Asian Ideas, 116–18.
74 Rabindranath Tagore, “International Relations (A Lecture Delivered in Japan),” The
Visva-Bharati Quarterly 2, 4 (1925): 307–16, 316.
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Chinese students.75 Nevertheless, Tagore did redirect some of the hopes he had
held for Japan to China, and he felt that China would soon wake up to her great
responsibilities to other countries.76 In Penang he said that his visit to China
had made him feel “like one of the great makers of history in Asia who
loom large in the domain of Indo-Chinese culture, of a synthesis of cultures
of India and China.”77
Although there certainly was overlap here with concerns held by individ-
ual Japanese and Chinese intellectuals,78 the vision of an “Asian civilization” as
a spiritual “Anti-Europe” and world-redeemer, so widely spread in Hindu refor-
mist circles, had very limited export potential. This, at least, can be gathered
from Tagore’s reception in East Asia. But in the India of the 1920s and
1930s, too, marked by a growing impact of the nationalist movement and
especially by Gandhi’s campaigns for mass mobilization, few shared
Tagore’s rigorous condemnation of nationalism. It is here that the tensions
between nationalism and internationalism manifest themselves most obviously.
It was not so much Tagore’s message of Asianism as his rather elitist cosmopo-
litanism and intellectual anti-nationalism that were being rejected.
Nevertheless, there would always be an audience for Tagore’s vision for
Asia, even if relatively small. Visva Bharati at Santiniketan continued to be a
venue for Asian activities through the Centre for Chinese Studies, founded
as the “China House” (Cheen Bhavan) in 1937. Their activities were further
made public through the Visva Bharati Quarterly, which devoted much space
to Tagore’s intentions for the new Centre. Cheen Bhavan, it was explained,
had been built “to maintain and nourish the distinctive merit of our respective
cultures and not to be misled into believing that what is ancient is necessarily
outworn.… And can anything be more worthy of being cherished than the
beautiful spirit of the Chinese culture that has made the people love material
things without the stain of greed?”79
But neither did Tagore ever abandon his hopes for Japan. He continued to
correspond publicly with Yone Noguchi on Asian issues as late 1938 and
speculated that the country would abstain from aggression and find its “true
75 Described in greater detail in Dominic Sachsenmaier, “Searching for Alternatives to Western
Modernity: Cross-Cultural Approaches in the Aftermath of the Great War,” Journal of Modern
European History 4, 2 (2006): 241–59, here 250–52; Dutta and Robinson, Rabindranath Tagore,
251–52.
76 “Speech to the Children of the Confucian School, Kuala Lumpur, on 6th August, 1927,” in
S. Das Gupta, Tagore’s Asian Outlook (Calcutta: Nava Bharati, 1961), 66.
77 Tagore’s address to the Chinese community at Penang, 24 July 1927, quoted in idem, 66.
78 See, for example, the writings of contemporary East Asian intellectuals close to Tagore’s own
position: Liang Chi Chao, “China’s Debt to India,” Visva-Bharati Quarterly 2, 3. (1924): 251–61;
Matosada Zumoto, “Japan and the Pan-Asiatic Movement,” News Bulletin of the Institute of Pacific
Relations (Feb. 1927): 8–15; and Masaharu Anahaki, “Western Pressure and Eastern Resistance,”
Modern Review 61, 6 (1937): 617–18.
79 “India and China,” Visva Bharati Quarterly (May 1937): 29–34, here 32.
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Asian self” again, writing: “Japanese and Chinese people, let us hope, will join
hands together in no distant future, in wiping off memories of a bitter past. True
Asian humanity will be reborn.…”80
Even though imagining Asia as the spiritual antithesis of Europe, with the accom-
panying rejection of violence and/or aggressive nationalism, would at first glance
seem to be largely an academic exercise, it held potential for wider application.
The most prominent person to reformulate this Asianist essentialism in support of
a (nationalist) cause was Gandhi. Within his specific agenda, the “spiritual unity”
of Asia could become an argument against capitalism, industry, materialism, and
imperialism, or one in favor of nonviolence. But unlike Tagore, Gandhi seemed
to regard any involvement with the Asian scene as an unfortunate necessity. In
the war between Japan and China he supported neither side. He explained his
neutral position thusly: “China’s is not active non-violence. Her putting up a
valiant defence against Japan is proof enough that China was never intentionally
non-violent.… I wish the Chinese success. According to the accepted standards
her behaviour is strictly correct. But when the position is examined in terms of
nonviolence, I must say it is unbecoming for a nation of 400 millions, a nation
as cultured as Japan, to repel Japanese aggression by resorting to Japan’s own
methods.”81
Nevertheless, where Gandhi does speak out on the issue, it is to construct an
Asia that is Europe’s antithesis in every respect, where the focal point lies strictly
on the teachings of the Buddha and the cultural affinity with spirituality and non-
violence that he believed all Asians to share. He sought to legitimize this image of
Asia by participating in the cultural-historical discourse that was pervading the
Indian public sphere of the late 1930s, applying several of its most common
topoi, such as that of the ancient bonds between India and China, to his own
agenda. For instance, he redirected the image of the monk-missionary, then a
popular image of ancient Asian interconnectedness,82 to demonstrate the antiquity
of nonviolence as a concept: “It is not yetwell enough known in India that Lao Tze
whowas very nearly the contemporary ofGautama, theBuddha,made universally
recognised in China his own teaching of Tao. […] Such a spirit of harmony with
one’s surroundings as Tao’s is the very opposite of violence.…”83
In an article for his newspaper Young India, he brought up the perceived
new supranational (self)consciousness as a tool in the fight against the imperi-
alist world order, saying, “Common lot no less than territorial homogeneity and
80 Tagore to Noguchi, letter dated 1 Sept. 1938, in S. Das Gupta, Tagore’s Asian Outlook
(Calcutta: Nava Bharati, 1961): 138–51.
81 Harijan, 24 Dec. 1938: 394.
82 As demonstrated by Joseph Alter, particularly in his treatment of P. C. Bagchi’s work. “Yoga
in Asia—Mimetic History: Problems in the Location of Secret Knowledge,” in Comparative
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29, 2 (2009): 213–29.
83 C.F.A., Harijan, 4 Feb. 1939: 456.
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cultural affinity is bringing Asiatic races wonderfully together, and they now
seem determined to take their share in world politics.”84 Still, it would be mis-
leading to portray Gandhi as a champion of pan-Asianism. To his mind, the
tension between nationalism and internationalism was particularly strong.
Gandhi’s goal was autarchy, and on more than one occasion he called a
united Asian stand against imperialism (rather than an all-India one) a waste
of resources. India should first be capable of standing on her own: “If we are
in effect truly unable to help others and only ask for something at their
hands it would not conduce to mutual esteem; nor can a healthy alliance
grow.… The link of mere friendship of slavery is not likely to be a real or
useful bond. Why do we turn to Russia, China or Turkey? It is not simply
the greatness of the past history of these nations that attracts us.… It is
because we believe that there are great movements now going on in those
countries which furnish matter for useful study or admiring observation.”85
At a much later stage, Gandhi did make one appearance in the theatre of
pan-Asianism. On the threshold of Independence, the historic Purana Qila (Old
Fort) in New Delhi was the scene for the first Asian Relations Conference in
March 1947, and Gandhi’s rather ambiguous role in the proceedings is worth
mapping out. Nehru had invited him to attend, and he consented provided it
did not interfere with his many other obligations. But as the conference drew
near, it became clear that his presence would be vital. Gandhi was not a
pan-Asianist, but Asia certainly wanted to speak to him: the delegates to the
Conference all expressed the desire to meet the Mahatma and hear him on
“Asia’s contribution to world peace.”86 A question and answer session
was indeed organized, at which his reluctance was pronounced. He addressed
the two hundred-odd delegates with the following words: “Let me confess
my ignorance. I have really to apologize to you. Pandit Nehru has asked
me long before … whether it would at all be possible for me to attend.
It has proved a much more important conference than it was expected to
be….”87
Nevertheless, Gandhi used the two sessions he attended to map out his
Asia to the audience: an Asia that would contribute to building One World,
the Great Edifice of Truth, and bring to the West her message of harmony.
Stating that wisdom had come to the West from the East, he said: “The first
of these wise men was Zoroaster. He belonged to the East. He was followed
by Buddha who belonged to the East—India. Who followed Buddha? Jesus,
who came from the East. Before Jesus was Moses, who belonged to Palestine
84 Cited in Prasad, Indian Nationalism, 107.
85 Editorial, Young India, 1 Mar. 1928: 67.
86 “Mahatma to Address Inter-Asian Meet?” Bombay Chronicle, 24 Mar. 1947: 1.
87 “Questions and Answers between Gandhi and Delegates,” Harijan, 20 Apr. 1947: 113.
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though he was born in Egypt. After Jesus came Mohammed. I omit my refer-
ence to Krishna and Rama and other lights. I do not call them lesser lights but
they are less known to the literary world. All the same I do not know a single
person in the world to match these men of Asia. And then what happened?
Christianity became disfigured when it went to the West. I am sorry to have
to say that.”88
His message to the delegates had, according to him, already been taught to
them in their own lands, thus emphasizing his view of an inherent and shared
Asian spirituality. His words echo Tagore and Vivekananda: that it was up to
Asia to re-spiritualize the hollow West and to bring Asia’s message of
harmony to Eur-America. That this message still had enough resonance to be
employed in a large gathering of delegates from all over Asia shortly after
the turbulent years of the war is testimony to the resilience of this particular dis-
course of Asia, and demonstrates that it did not die in the disillusion over the
Sino-Japanese war. The following part of his speech therefore deserves to be
quoted in full:
What I want you to understand is the message of Asia. It is not to be learned through
the Western spectacles or by imitating the atom bomb. If you want to give a message
to the West, it must be the message of love and the message of truth.… I am certain
that if all of you put your hearts together—not merely heads—to understand the
secret of the message these wise men of the East have left to us, and if we really
become worthy of that great message, the conquest of the West will be completed.
This conquest will be loved by the West.… It is up to you to tell the world of its
wickedness and sin—that is the heritage your teachers and my teachers have taught
Asia.89
The Asianist message encountered eager audiences at every turn, depending on
the way the message was formulated, and to what political ends. As the next
example will show, even imperialism and civilizing missions were accepted
in certain intellectual and political circles, albeit only if they spread the
“right kind” of civilization.
Asia as “India Magna”: Kalidas Nag and the Greater India Society
In view of the emerging anti-imperialist consensus in the Indian and inter-
national public spheres, irony does not spare the fact that in the 1920s a
further influential Asia-discourse came into being, which celebrated India’s
past as a colonizer and “bringer of civilization” to Southeast Asia. The
members of the Greater India Society, established in Calcutta in 1926, were
without doubt inspired by Tagore’s concept of Asia,90 but developed it in
88 Ibid.: 116.
89 Ibid.: 117.
90 Kalidas Nag was not only an admirer of the Bengali poet but also a close collaborator, accom-
panying Tagore on his tour of France in 1920, and his tour of Asia four years later.
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another direction. Two of its founders shared an exceptional academic back-
ground, which was crucial for their views on Asia.91
Kalidas Nag (1888–1980) and P. C. Bagchi (1898–1956) obtained their
doctorates in Paris with the French Indologists Sylvain Lévi (1863–1935)
and Jean Przyluski (1885–1944), and had thus become Orientalists by train-
ing—in the pre-Saidian sense of the word. They derived their concept of
Asia from European academic discourses, although they did not draw from
the German and English Orientalism prevalent in British India, but rather
from the autonomous French variety. What made the theories of Lévi and his
students so attractive to Indian intellectuals?92 In opposition to the widely
held paradigms of evolution, which depicted the history of humanity as a
sequence of the rise and fall of civilizations (whereby the “Oriental” ones
were usually represented as extinct or degenerate), the French academics
were interested in translocal longue durée processes of cultural transfer. Diffu-
sion, and not évolution, explained, in their opinion, the different stages of
development, or “civilizational phases” of nations.93 In his early writings on
the foundation of the fields of epigraphy, literature, and architecture in Indo-
china, Lévi had pointed to India as the great civilizational force of Asia.94
Hindu and Buddhist India had, according to him, spread their cultural, spiritual,
and material accomplishments throughout a space that reached “from Persia to
the Chinese Sea and from the icy coast of Siberia to Java and Borneo.”95
Such messages were easily compatible with a nationalist agenda. Indeed,
Lévi himself seems to have been not only an admirer of the “genius of India”96
but also very sympathetic to the cause of Indian independence.97 Lévi’s Indian
91 See Susan Bayly, “Imagining ‘Greater India’: French and Indian Visions of Colonialism in the
Indic Mode,” Modern Asian Studies 38, 3 (2004): 703–44; and “India’s “Empire of Culture”:
Sylvain Lévi and the Greater India Society,” in L. Bansat-Boudon and R. Lardinois, eds.,
Sylvain Lévi (1863–1935): Études Indiennes, histoire sociale: Actes du Colloque tenu a Paris
les 8–10 Octobre 2003 (Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2007), 193–212.
92 The popularity of Lévi spread far wider than the small circle of his students. Tagore invited
him to Santiniketan in Bengal, where he was the first foreign visiting professor in 1921/22 at
Vishva-Bharati, the university founded by the poet. See Roland Lardinois, L’invention de l’Inde.
Entre ésotérisme et science (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2007), 211; and Kalidas Nag, Discovery of
Asia (Calcutta: Institute of Asian African Relations, 1957), 10–11.
93 Susan Bayly, “French Anthropology and the Durkheimians in Colonial Indochina,” Modern
Asian Studies 34, 3 (2000): 581–622.
94 Sylvain Lévi, L’Inde civilisatrice: aperçu historique (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1938). A collection
of his writings on the topic, which Lévi wrote with two of his students, was translated into English
by P. C. Bagchi and published in India: Sylvain Lévi, Jean Przyluski, and Marc Bloch, Pre-Aryan
and Pre-Dravidian in India (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1929).
95 Cited in Kalidas Nag, “Sylvain Lévi and the Science of Indology,” Journal of the Greater
India Society 3, 1 (1936): 3–13, here 12.
96 This was already evident from his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France. Sylvain Lévi,
Génie de l’Inde, Roland Lardinois, ed. (Paris: Éditions Allia, 2008).
97 Lévi and P. C. Bagchi belonged to a Paris society called “Les Amis des Orients” that was sha-
dowed by the British C.I.D., suspected of involvement in “seditious activities.” “Afghans and
Indians in Paris,” report by Col. Humphrys, 21 Dec. 1925, APAC, IOR, L/PJ/12/219.
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followers stressed the active role of ancient India in the cultural fertilization and
“development” of Southeast Asia. These topoiwere taken up again and again in
both academic and popular publications,98 some of which were translated into
Indian regional languages.
The thesis that India had been not only a highly developed civilization long
before its contact with Europe, but also a hegemon and civilizational force in
Asia, supplied valuable ammunition to the anti-colonial struggle for freedom. The
famous Indian historian R. C. Majumdar (1888–1980),99 one of the co-founders
of the Greater India Society,100 dedicated a two-volume monograph to the idea of
Ancient Indian Colonies in the Far East.101 The message was clear: India’s past
as a colonial power raised it to the level of a “civilized nation.” Moreover, Indian
imperialism was superior to its European counterparts because it had aimed
solely at “uplifting” the colonized areas.102 Through this emphasis on India’s role
as colonizer and harbinger of culture in Asia—criticized by current historiogra-
phy103—the image of India in the West as self-centered and static was
supposed to be disproved. Vis-à-vis the British, India could position itself as the
superior “colonial power” because its colonizing had been pacifist and benign.
The idea of “Greater India” soon became part and parcel of the cultural baggage
of the educated classes, cutting through the whole political spectrum of India. It
98 Paresh Chandra Dasgupta, “Cultural Affinity between India and Siam,” Journal of the
Greater India Society 17, 1 & 2 (1958): 269–308; and O. C. Gangoly, “On Some Hindu Relics
in Borneo,” Journal of the Greater India Society 3, 1 (1936): 97–103; Kalidas Nag, Greater
India (A Study in Indian Internationalism) (Calcutta: Greater India Society, 1926); Prabodh
Chandra Bagchi, India and China (Calcutta: Greater India Society, 1927); Bijan Raj Chatterjee,
Indian Culture in Java and Sumatra (Calcutta: Greater India Society, 1927); Niranjan Prasad
Chakravarti, India and Central Asia (Calcutta: Greater India Society, 1927); and Upendranath
Ghoshal, Ancient Indian Culture in Afghanistan (Calcutta: Greater India Society, 1928); see also
Sadananda, Pilgrimage to Greater India (Calcutta: Swami Sadananda, 1936).
99 R. C. Majumdar is seen as one of the most influential historians of his generation. Later in life
he was known mostly for his monumental publication: R. C. Majumdar et al., eds., The History and
Culture of the Indian People, 11 vols. (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1951–1977). His work is
criticized in part for its conservative Hindu-nationalist overtones. See also Dietmar Rothermund,
“Die Geschichtsschreibung im unabhängigen Indien: Bürgerlich-nationale, marxistische und subal-
terne Perspektiven,” Comparativ 11, 4 (2001): 31–39, esp. 31–32.
100 See E. S. Craighill Handy, “The Renaissance of Indian Culture: Its Significance for the
Pacific and the World,” Pacific Affairs 3, 4 (1930): 362–69, 364.
101 R. C. Majumdar, Ancient Indian Colonies in the Far East, vols. 1 & 2 (Lahore: The Punjab
Sanskrit Book Depot, 1927). Interestingly, Majumdar’s writings on “Greater India” were repub-
lished in the 1990s: History of the Hindu Colonization and the Hindu Culture in South-East
Asia (New Delhi: Classical Publishers, 1996).
102 Cited in Michael Gottlob, ed., Historical Thinking in South Asia: A Handbook of Sources
from Colonial Times to the Present (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), 161–62.
103 Kirti N. Chaudhuri, Asia before Europe: Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean from
the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 58–59. For the back-
ground and content of this understanding of Hindu-“xenology,” see also Wilhelm Halbfass,
India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1991), 172–96.
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was especially popular with the supporters of Hindu nationalist parties and
organizations. The Hindu Mahasabha party, for instance, took up the rhetoric
of an Indian civilizing mission and decided at its 1932 meeting to send
Indian cultural delegations to neighboring countries, to “relive the feeling of
the fundamental unity of Asia.”104
The focal point of Asianism for the Hindu Mahasabha was the attempt to
appropriate Asia as a Hindu-Buddhist continent. This, by definition, entailed a
geographical conception of Asia that was different from, for instance, an Asia
as envisaged by Muslim leaders like the Aga Khan.105 As a result, most of the
international activities of the Hindu Mahasabha were directed eastwards.
Nevertheless, there was the odd attempt to appropriate the western part of
the continent, such as “Hindus of Arabia: Their Marvellous Survival,” by
T. S. Vinayaka Rao, a lawyer from Madras. He wrote to the Hindu Outlook,
a mouthpiece of the Hindu Mahasabha: “A small community of people who
profess Hinduism and who are idol worshippers have been existing for
several centuries in Arabia surrounded as it were by fanatical Muslim
tribes.”106 But such wild initiatives, however useful for the Mahasabha’s dom-
estic agenda, proved elusive.
In order to lay claim to Asian civilization through an “Out of India” theory,
in the context of the Hindu Mahasabha, the first task was to establish that Hin-
duism and Buddhism were one. This was an undertaking enthusiastically
appropriated by the Hindu Mahasabha Working Committee, which passed a
resolution advocating cultural contact between Hindus and Buddhists in
Burma. “Buddhism, to which the majority of the Burmese belong, was of
Indian origin. In fact, in the beginning it was only a reformation movement
among the Hindus. Hence Buddhists are as much Hindus as Protestants are
Christians.”107 This was fully in line with the Hindutva definition as per
V. D. Savarkar, the Mahasabha leader.108 It would become a common theme
in Mahasabha circles, through which relations with Buddhist organizations
elsewhere in Asia were pursued.
However, this discourse was not limited to a set of Hindu Mahasabha
initiatives to further its domestic agenda. Rather, the organization was drawn
into existing networks of Indian revolutionaries resident elsewhere in Asia.
Petitions submitted to the Hindu Mahasabha, because the sender perceived
104 Rabindranath Tagore, “Asian Cultural Rapprochement,” Modern Review 54 (Dec. 1933):
661–65, here 661. Contemporary Hindu-nationalist groups have employed a surprisingly similar
rhetoric. See also Susan Bayly, “India’s ‘Empire of Culture,’” 210–11.
105 It was also different from the perception of Greater India Society’s Kalidas Nag, who was
eager to search for “Aryan” remnants further west. K. Nag, Greater India; and India and the
Middle East (Calcutta: M. C. Sarkar & Sons, 1954).
106 Hindu Outlook, 27 July 1940: 13.
107 Hindu Outlook, 25 May 1940: 3.
108 Vinayak D. Savarkar,Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? (NewDelhi: Bharati Sahitya Sadan, 2005),
17.
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them to fit the organization’s agenda, actually outnumber the initiatives orig-
inating in the Mahasabha itself. V. D. Savarkar’s private correspondence
offers fascinating insights into both the transnational networks that were fos-
tered through this perceived Hindu-Buddhist unity and the existing revolution-
ary networks that were eager to use the rhetoric for obtaining funds, contacts,
and goodwill in India, especially in the 1930s. Savarkar maintained a lively cor-
respondence with Rash Behari Bose in Tokyo, who wrote in 1938: “The Bud-
dhists are also Hindus, and every attempt should be made to create a Hindu
block extending from the Indian Ocean up to the Pacific Ocean. For this
purpose, the Hindu Sabha should take immediate steps for establishing
branches of Mahasabha in Japan, China, Siam and other countries of the
Pacific and sending their representatives for creating solidarity among the
Eastern races.”109 Although Savarkar was not very receptive to the idea of
devoting Mahasabha resources to international activities, he had no objection
to revolutionaries creating their own momentum. Orders went out through
the general secretary in Bombay: “Our President will be glad and feel
obliged if you yourself take the lead and start a branch of the Hindu Mahasabha
in Japan even though it may not show a large number of members. But it cannot
fail to be an authorised International mouth piece of the Hindu Maha Sabha and
Hindudom as such in Eastern foreign countries.”110 It must also be mentioned
that Savarkar did reach out internationally. He kept up a lively exchange with
the prime ministers of Burma and Nepal and organizations in those countries
throughout the 1930s, ensuring through resident Indian intermediaries that fra-
ternal greetings from the Hindu Mahasabha to their “co-religionists” were reg-
ularly published in local papers.
It is important to mention at this junction that this appropriation of Bud-
dhism was not confined to Hindutva. Buddhist revivalism was sweeping
across Asia and its leaders found ample hearing in India. A good example is
the Indian network forged by the Ceylonese Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–
1933), another delegate to the Chicago World Parliaments of Religions, who
was able to use the organizational impetus provided by the Theosophical move-
ment to initiate a variety of initiatives in India.111 Gatherings such as the first
Pan-Pacific Buddhist Conference (1930) or the Conference of Pan-Pacific
Young Buddhist Associations (1934) received wide publicity. The increased
presence of itinerant Asian monks in India in the wake of this revival movement
was cause of concern for the British, who suspected a “disturbing connection”
between this new Buddhist enthusiasm and “the pan-Asiatic idea.”112 Weekly
109 Rashbehari Bose to Savarkar, 11 July 1938, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Savarkar
Private Papers, R6450/23.
110 Idem, letter dated 18 Aug. 1938.
111 B. G. Gokhale, “Theravada Buddhism and Modernization: Anagarika Dhammapala and
B. R. Ambedkar,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 34, 1 (1999): 33–45, here 33.
112 APAC, IOR, P&J/12/480, Home Department, 9 Apr. 1934.
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intelligence reports regularly mention monks, ostensibly engaged in pilgrimage,
who “express an interest in politics” or were suspected of being “secret
emissaries.”113
Finally, the “IndiaMagna” thesis was adopted into a political register as well.
Jawaharlal Nehru, known as a rigorous proponent of secularism, was among its
politically more moderate supporters. He cites Sylvain Lévi’s l’Inde Civilisatrice
several times in his widely read booksDiscovery of India and Glimpses of World
History.114 One might speculate that the attempts at Asian integration during
Nehru’s term in office were inspired partly by the idea of Greater India.115
Indeed, the theme resurfaced in the proceedings of theAsianRelationsConference
in 1947. The welcome address by Chairman of the Reception Committee Sir Shri
Ram read: “In futurewe shall all…visit eachother’s countries often,… even if not
on the scale on which contacts existed at one time between southeast Asia and the
kingdoms of the Pandyas and the Cholas.”116
However, one need not take an Asianist perspective to locate problems
inherent in conceptions of “India Magna.” The idea of India as a benign colo-
nial power is pervaded by a paternalistic attitude toward “Island India” or
Southeast Asia, perceived as culturally similar. Such rhetoric was politically
volatile, not least because of the existence of large Indian diasporas in South-
east Asian countries.117 This was one reason why anti-Indian attitudes pre-
vailed in Ceylon and Malaya. In Burma, the 1930s saw multiple pogroms
against Indian minorities.118
Into the 1930s and 1940s, it became clear that the rhetoric of Greater India
had far outlived its academic base. As Independence and the possible partition
of the country drew near, the Hindu right had firmly appropriated the concept of
Asia as a Hindu-Buddhist continent. The idea that “civilization” was “Hindu-
Buddhist” came to carry the connotation that it was “non-Muslim,” and the
rhetoric was domesticated as a Hindu-nationalist tool. The Greater India
Society continued its activities, but its output was far outstripped by the clamor-
ing of the Hindu-right press.119 The year 1959, in which the Journal of the
113 APAC, IOR, P&J/12/45, Far Eastern Department, 29 Aug. 1921.
114 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (Repr. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992
[1946]), 200–10; and Glimpses of World History (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1964 [1934]),
101–5, 136–40.
115 See also Jaffrelot, “India’s Look East Policy,” 38–40.
116 Report on the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference, New
Delhi, March–April 1947 (New Delhi: Asian Relations Organization, 1948).
117 See Sunil Amrith, “Tamil Diasporas across the Bay of Bengal,” American Historical Review
114, 3 (2009): 547–72; Michael Mann, Geschichte Indiens vom 18. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert
(Paderborn: UTB, 2005), 207–75.
118 For Southeast Asian skepticism, see also Keenleyside, “Nationalist Indian Attitudes,” 221.
119 In particular, “Long Live Greater Bharat,” Organiser, 16 Nov. 1949; “Bharat Must Save
Tibet,” Organiser, 23 Nov. 1949; “Why India Should Recognize Israel,” Hindu Outlook, 4 Apr.
1950; “The International Aspects of Hindu Nationalism,”Hindu Outlook, 8 Nov. 1953; “Pan-Islam,
A Living Force,” Organiser, 22 Feb. 1957.
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Greater India Society drew to a close, also marked the start of the conflict with
China, which finally eclipsed any ideas of Hindu-Buddhist brotherhood.
“Young Asia”: Asia as the Site of a Superior Modernity
While Greater India Asianism, through its consistent emphasis on the importance
of Hindu and Buddhist “colonizers,” still partly drew on the larger East-West
cliché, the third kind of Asianism to be explored here radically resisted
the axiom of the inherent “spirituality” of Asia. The Calcuttan homo universalis
Benoy Kumar Sarkar (1883–1949)120 and the diasporic revolutionary Taraknath
Das (1884–1958)121 were “Young Asia’s” most important prophets in India.
Sarkar’s contribution, especially, deserves further examination. This economist
and sociologist from Calcutta, all but forgotten today, wielded considerable influ-
ence during his lifetime and had a significant impact on intellectual life in his
Bengali homeland as much as he formed the image of India in Europe and the
United States.
Benoy Kumar Sarkar’s political roots lay in the Swadeshi movement.122
This experience would mark him for the rest of his life. He became a radical
anti-imperialist and aimed at a career in the British-Indian diplomatic service
to support independent “national” institutes.123 Between 1914 and 1925 he tra-
veled extensively in Asia before teaching at various universities in Europe and
North America. After his return to India he became the chair of Economics at
the University of Calcutta in 1926.
His central theme, expressed in countless publications, was India’s con-
nections to other Asian countries. During the First World War, he proposed
the first tenets of his concept of Asia on a lecturing tour of the United
States.124 In The Futurism of Young Asia, published in Berlin in 1922, he
elaborated on these basics of his pan-Asian project. He saw a collective
battle of Asians against the political and intellectual dominance of the West,
or as he called it, “Euro-America.” The leitmotif of Asian cooperation was
120 For Sarkar’s biography, see Robert E. Frykenberg, “Benoy Kumar Sarkar, 1887–1949, Pol-
itical Rishi of Twentieth-Century Bengal,” in G. Berkemer et al., eds., Explorations in the History of
South Asia: Essays in Honour of Dietmar Rothermund (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001), 197–217; and
Haridas Mukherjee, Benoy Kumar Sarkar: A Study (Calcutta: Das Gupta and Co., 1953), 3–25.
121 For a biography, see: Tapan K. Mukherjee, Taraknath Das: Life and Letters of a Revolution-
ary in Exile (Calcutta: National Council of Education, 1998).
122 On the Swadeshi movement, see, inter alia, Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colo-
nial Economy to National Space (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 244–76; Rajat
Kanta Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest in Bengal, 1875–1927 (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1984), 160–206; and Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903–1908 (New
Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1973).
123 Swapan Kumar Bhattacharya, Indian Sociology: The Role of Benoy Kumar Sarkar
(Burdwan: University of Burdwan, 1990), 40–54.
124 Lecture at Clark University, Worcester, Mass., Nov. 1917, published as: Benoy Kumar
Sarkar, “The Futurism of Young Asia,” International Journal of Ethics 28, 4 (1918): 521–41.
88 C A R O L I E N S T O L T E A N D H A R A L D F I S C H E R - T I N É
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417511000594
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 13:53:38, subject to the Cambridge Core
to him a “war against colonialism in politics and against orientalisme in
science.”125
Japan, Sarkar argued, had delivered proof of Asia’s equality in the military
and economic arena. Given such a state of affairs, political decolonization
would be only a matter of time. For this reason, the focal point of joint
efforts by the peoples of Asia should lie on their mental decolonization. A “cri-
tique of Western reason”126—to be formulated by Asians—was needed to bring
about the end of the intellectual hegemony of Eur-America. His considerations
in this sense revolved around two central arguments: First, the specter of the
inherent difference of Asia and the superiority of the West were historical con-
structs. Second, Orientalism perpetuated the myth of civilizational difference
insofar as it deduced insights into the character of entire civilizations from
older writings usually divorced from their historical context. Sarkar applied
himself to the production of “post-Orientalist” knowledge of the Orient, start-
ing with historical research on materialist traditions in India.127 But he looked
at other Asian nations as well, and published, among other things, a series of
writings on politics and religion in China, Japan, and Persia.128 The self-
appointed representative of Young Asia profited especially from his impressive
linguistic capabilities. On one hand, he sought academic Western and Indian
readerships via publications in English, German, French, and Italian.129 On
the other, he translated his insights into Bengali and Hindi for Indian non-elite
or secondary elite readers.130
Institutionally, he tried to draw attention to his pan-Asian agenda in the
early 1930s through the foundation of the Bengali Asia Parishad. This was a
125 Benoy Kumar Sarkar, The Futurism of Young Asia and other Essays on the Relations
between the East and the West (Berlin: Springer, 1922), iv.
126 Sarkar, “Futurism of Young Asia,” 521. See also, Dhruv Raina and Irfan S. Habib, “The
Moral Legitimation of Modern Science: Bhadralok Reflections on Theories of Evolution,”
Social Studies of Science 26, 1 (1996): 9–42, here 27–29.
127 Benoy Kumar Sarkar, Hindu Achievements in Exact Sciences (London: Longmans, Green
and Co., 1918); “Public Finance in Ancient India,” Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science 97 (Sept. 1921): 151–69; The Positive Background of Hindu Sociology: Intro-
duction to Hindu Positivism (Sacred Books of the Hindus, vol. 23) (Allahabad: The Panini Office,
1937 [1914]).
128 Benoy Kumar Sarkar, “Sino-Japanese Buddhism and Neo-Hinduism,” Modern Review 20
(July 1916): 39–47; “The Democratic Background of Chinese Culture,” Scientific Monthly 8, 1
(1919): 58–65; “Reshaping of the Middle East,” Journal of Race Development 9, 4 (1919): 332–
43; “The Beginnings of the Republic in China,” Modern Review (Aug. 1920): 119–24; and
“Persia and the Persian Gulf (1906–1919),” in Futurism of Young Asia, 38–47.
129 Benoy Kumar Sarkar, “La Théorie de la Constitution dans la Philosophie Indienne,” Revue
de Synthèse Historique 31 (Aug.–Dec. 1920): 47–52; Die Lebensanschauung des Inders (Leipzig:
Markert and Petters, 1923); and “Societá ed economia nell’India antica e moderna,” Annali di Econ-
omia 6, 2 (1930): 303–47.
130 In this context, the volumes of Benoy Kumar Sarkar—Barttamān Jagat (The world of today)
(5 Vols., Calcutta: Grihastha Publishing House, 1915–1923)—must be noted, in which he brought
to a Bengali readership the culture, society, and politics of the countries that he visited during his
first long world tour. See also: Mukherjee, Benoy Kumar Sarkar, 19.
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platform for scientists, literati, and intellectuals to discuss issues concerning
Asia. Among the themes of discussions were “The Asian Movement in
India” and “Asia in Bengali Thought,” but also the “Economic Expansion of
the Japanese People.”131 This clearly shows that Sarkar’s understanding of
Asia shared little with Tagore’s more romantic vision; Sarkar saw no alternative
to fast and full modernization. In The Futurism of Young Asia, he explains:
“The people of Asia have no choice before them but to accept all the new
vidyas and kalas, sciences, arts, mechanisms and institutions of Eur-America
from the steam engine to radioactivity and from The Wealth of Nations to Bol-
shevism.… The only problem before the East is to try by all means to catch up
to the West at the Japanese rate of advance and establish once more the foun-
dations of equality and reciprocal respect that governed the relations between
Asia and Europe in ancient and mediaeval times.”132 Aside from this appeal
for non-selective modernization, his view on the widely promulgated concept
of an “Asian mind” is also remarkable. Fully consistent with his critique of
Orientalism, Sarkar professed the strategic-essentialist notion that the Asian
nations did not belong to one “Asian civilization,” but were building a commu-
nity nonetheless because they shared the challenge posed by the West.
This unsentimental estimation is found almost literally in Taraknath Das’
writings. He too was a dedicated supporter of the concept of Young Asia.
Taraknath Das had been educated partly in the West and, like Sarkar, was fam-
iliar with American academic traditions.133 But his fight against the imperial-
ism of the West went further than the Calcuttan professor of economics’
intellectual engagement. After being forced to flee India in 1906 as a suspected
“terrorist,” he traveled to Japan before moving to the United States. On arrival
he joined the Ghadar party, which had been founded by Indian exiles in
San Francisco.134 This revolutionary group advocated armed struggle against
the British Empire and was supported by the German secret service during
the First World War. In 1916, Taraknath Das returned to Japan, closely
trailed by British Intelligence, which suspected that he had embarked on a pro-
paganda tour of the Far East.135 He maintained that he was engaged in a
131 Sarkar, “Indo-Asian Contacts,” 133–34.
132 Sarkar, Futurism of Young Asia, 333.
133 Das earned a masters degree in Political Science from the University of Washington in 1911,
and his doctorate in 1925 from Georgetown University. For further biographical details, see T. K.
Mukherjee, Taraknath Das; Ranendranath Das, Taraknath Das—Ein Lebensbild des indischen
Revolutionärs, Freiheitskämpfers und Gelehrten (Berlin: Taraknath Das-Stiftung, 1996).
134 On the activities and ideology of the Ghadar, see inter alia: Maia Ramnath, “Two Revolu-
tions: The Ghadar Movement and India’s Radical Diaspora, 1913–1918,” Radical History
Review 92 (2005): 7–30; Karl Hoover, “The Hindu Conspiracy in California, 1913–1918,”
German Studies Review 8, 2 (1985): 245–61; Harish K. Puri, Ghadar Movement: Ideology, Organ-
isation, and Strategy (Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University Press, 1983); and Sohan Singh Josh,
Hindustan Gadar Party: A Short History, 2 vols. (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1978).
135 Apparently he managed to travel the Far East disguised as a patent medicine salesman.
APAC, IOR, P&J/12/166: File on Taraknath Das (1923).
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research project regarding the rise of Japan. Both were true: in 1917, from
Shanghai, he published Is Japan a Menace to Asia? He answered his question
in the negative, arguing instead that Japan was only a menace to European
domination in Asia. The book received a considerable amount of press due
in part to a foreword by former Prime Minister of China Tong Shao-Yi, and
an appendix by Ichiro Tokutomi of the Japanese House of Peers. The otherwise
pro-British Far Eastern Review even dubbed it “the magnum opus” of the
pan-Asiatic movement.136
After Taraknath Das had distanced himself from violence and terrorist
methods in the 1920s, he published a series of academic papers and articles in
Indian journals in which he often promoted the role of “Young Asia” in a
futureworld order. In one 1929 article he articulated his pragmatic understanding
ofAsian solidarity poignantly: “Today all theAsian peoples feel their ownweak-
ness and realize the necessity of some form of concerted action to attain the goal
of securing their freedom. This is the true underlying cause of the movement of
Pan-Asianism. The movement of Pan-Asianism is bound to be a vital factor
towards the accomplishment of Asian Independence; and without Asian Inde-
pendence any programme for World Peace is a mere mockery.”137
C O N C L U S I O N
Forty years ago, the American historian John Steadman wrote that the concept
of Asia was so popular with artists, poets, and politicians because there was no
clear definition—just a series of emotionally charged connotations that made it
versatile in its uses.138 Our analysis of Asianism in political and intellectual
debate in India supports that thesis. Taken together, one must conclude that
“Asia” in this period was a free-floating signifier, a container to be filled
with meaning when a particular agenda so required. The three discourses we
have discussed, despite their considerable overlaps and mutual borrowings,
ultimately put forward very distinct definitions of Asia. Tagore’s spiritual
understanding of Asia, embedded in the postulate of a universal synthesis of
East and West, did partly inspire the seemingly nativistic panegyrics on the
accomplishments of “Greater India,” but it ultimately had little in common
with them. And both are hard to reconcile with the sober and pragmatic defi-
nition of Asia by Benoy Kumar Sarkar and Taraknath Das, for whom Asian
solidarity represented solely a temporary and goal-oriented bond in the battle
against the hegemony of Eur-America and for overcoming the colonial trauma.
136 Quoted in Mukherjee, Taraknath Das, 101.
137 Taraknath Das, “Pan Asianism, Asian Independence andWorld Peace,”Modern Review (Jan.
1929): 44–52. See also Taraknath Das, “Awakened Asia and Germany in World Politics,” Calcutta
Review (Oct. 1927): 107–13.
138 John Steadman, The Myth of Asia (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), 35.
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With that, we have arrived at the question as to the motives for using Asia
in a continuum of prospective collective identities that ranged from sub-
nationalism to cosmopolitan universalism. This raises the issue of the common-
alities shared by the three designs. The reaction to the hegemony of the West
and the critique of the imperial world order lies at the base of all three Asian-
isms in question. Europe, Eur-America, or the Occident are omnipresent in all
of them. It is implicit in the Greater India model, with its construction of a “ben-
evolent imperialism,” which takes up the contemporary European rhetoric of
“development” or “mise en valeur” and seeks to trump it. It is explicit in the
Asianisms of Tagore and Sarkar.
The third question we posed at the outset, regarding the interplay between
supranational Asia-discourses and the various nationalisms in the region,
requires a differentiated answer. The clearest conflict with nationalist
agendas was provoked by Tagore’s recapturing of the transnational category
of civilization. Not only were Japanese hardliners dissatisfied with his rejection
of all nationalisms; it also alienated him from the mainstream of the Indian
nationalist movement. His elitist, cosmopolitan Asianism no longer fit the
spirit of the times during the mass campaigns of Gandhi, and Tagore’s role
in the political debate diminished. On the other hand, the connection
between “civilizationism,” nationalism, and imperialism as per Duara is
clearly discernible in the concept of Greater India. The Greater India thesis pro-
moted the construction of a national identity to the degree that the strengthened
nationalism took on an imperialist guise. Even if it was subtler than the doctrine
of a “Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” as developed contemporaneously in
Japan, it provoked new conflicts rather than promoting integration.
The intended emancipation from the intellectual paradigms of the West
met with equally limited success. At most, concepts, categories, and binary
oppositions were appropriated from the “West.” Only a handful of “thinking
Asiatics,”139 such as Benoy Kumar Sarkar and Taraknath Das, rejected con-
cepts like “civilization” or “cultural community” as irrelevant to Young Asia.
Although their strategic Asianism was marked by considerations of “Realpoli-
tik” and advocated a modernization after the Western example, it made them
paradoxically the only ones who could move beyond the hegemonic Western
paradigms of civilization. But in this case too, Asianism remained more of a
discursive mode than a specific political project.
139 Banerji, Asianism and other Essays, 1.
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